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ABSTRACT  
It is commonplace amongst philosophers of art to make claims which postulate important 
links between aesthetics and perception. In this paper, I focus on one such claim: that 
perception is the canonical route to aesthetic judgement. I consider a range of prima facie 
plausible interpretations of this claim and argue that they each fail to identify any 
important link between aesthetic judgement and perception. Given this, I conclude that 
we have good reason to be sceptical of the claim that perception is in any way privileged 
as a source of aesthetic judgement. 
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1. Aesthetics and Perception 
Throughout the history of aesthetics philosophers have postulated a fundamental connection 
(or connections) between perception and the aesthetic. Yet, despite this common theme, there 
has been considerable disagreement as to the respects, if any, in which this connection 
manifests itself.  
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This paper focuses on one area where this claimed association is especially prominent: 
the epistemology of aesthetic judgement. A number of prominent aestheticians have 
maintained that (with, perhaps, a few minor and isolated exceptions) perception is the only 
legitimate route to aesthetic judgement. As such, all sources of judgement other than 
perception are excluded. This influential position has, however, been questioned of late with 
several philosophers arguing that these other sources can frequently provide a legitimate 
basis for aesthetic judgements. Nonetheless, even they are often keen to stress that perception 
still plays a central, or canonical, role in the formation of aesthetic judgements (henceforth, ‘the 
perceptual canonicity claim’). The consensus remains, then, that perception provides the royal 
road to aesthetic judgement, and that other sources of judgement, if admitted at all, can only 
serve as ersatz stand-ins for direct perceptual experience.  
Further, advocates of the perceptual canonicity claim almost invariably take their 
claim to highlight something distinctive about the relationship between aesthetic judgement 
and perception. As such, they are keen to draw a contrast between aesthetic judgements and 
other species of judgement – such as judgements of colour – which we might ordinarily take 
to be strongly linked to perception.1 The thought being that there is some sense (or senses) in 
which perception provides the canonical route to the former but not to the latter. 
 
In this paper, I argue that the perceptual canonicity claim is mistaken. While it is no doubt 
true that perception often plays an important role in aesthetic judgement, there is no general 
reason to privilege perception above other sources of judgement. In §2 I clarify a few key 
                                                          
1 Contrasts with the colour case are drawn by, e.g., Alcaraz León [2008: 292], Pettit [1983: 25] and 
Gorodeisky [2010: 55]. 
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aspects of the perceptual canonicity claim and outline some important assumptions I will be 
making throughout the paper. In §3-6 I consider various interpretations of the perceptual 
canonicity claim and argue that they are uniformly unsuccessful. §7 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Some Clarifications 
Before I begin evaluating the perceptual canonicity claim, I will first clarify some key aspects 
of the claim itself. First, it is crucial to lay out precisely what I mean by ‘aesthetic judgement’ 
since this phrase has been employed in a range of different ways in the literature. In what 
follows, I will take the ‘judgement’ part of ‘aesthetic judgement’ to be equivalent to what Neil 
Sinclair [2006] calls ‘minimal belief’. That is, ‘any state of mind that is expressed by sincere 
assertoric use of a sentence’ [ibid.: 253]. This understanding is compatible with aesthetic 
judgements being beliefs in the standard cognitivist sense as well as their being some 
appropriate kind of non-cognitive state. It is, however, incompatible with certain prominent 
accounts of the nature of aesthetic judgement, such as those which view aesthetic judgements 
as primarily concerned with appreciation construed as ‘perceiving [a work’s aesthetic 
properties] as realized in the work’ [Budd 2003: 392]. There is, however, little to say about the 
perceptual canonicity claim when applied to aesthetic judgements understood in this manner 
since, while it is true that perception provides the canonical means to appreciation of this kind, 
this is a mere tautology.  
As to the ‘aesthetic’ part of ‘aesthetic judgement’, I will interpret this very broadly so 
as to include not only aesthetic concepts in Sibley’s [1959] sense but also what Sibley [1965: 
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136] terms ‘verdicts’. A such, it will include judgements as to an object’s being, for example, 
‘unified, balanced, integrated, lifeless, serene, sombre, dynamic, powerful, vivid, delicate, 
moving, trite, sentimental, tragic’ [1959: 421] as well as those concerning ‘whether things are 
aesthetically good or bad, excellent or mediocre, superior to others or inferior, and so on’ 
[1965: 136]. My aim will be to deny that the perceptual canonicity claim holds with respect to 
judgements of any of these properties. 
The ‘perceptual’ part of the perceptual canonicity claim is also to be understood very 
broadly so as to include judgements of the object itself made with respect to any perceptual 
modality (or cross-modal perception), perception of various stand-ins or surrogates 
(including photographs, reproductions, and the like), and sensory imagination.  
 
With these clarifications in place, the only part of the perceptual canonicity claim left to 
explain is what precisely it means for a certain route to judgement, aesthetic or otherwise, to 
be canonical. It is this task which will occupy the remainder of the paper. The central thought 
behind the canonicity intuition is, roughly, that there is – in contrast to judgements in other 
domains – something special or privileged about perception as a route to aesthetic judgement. 
There are, however, a number of importantly different ways in which this key idea might be 
spelled out. In the following sections I will consider four prima facie plausible interpretations 
of the perceptual canonicity claim and argue that they are uniformly unpersuasive.  
 
3. The Only Possible Route to Aesthetic Judgement? 
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A first interpretation of the perceptual canonicity claim maintains that perception is the only 
possible route to aesthetic judgement and that it is literally impossible to form a genuinely 
aesthetic judgement in the absence of perceptual experience. As such, perception earns the title 
of the canonical means to such judgements by default. To see why someone might accept an 
interpretation along these lines, consider the following famous passage from Sibley [ibid.: 
137]: 
To suppose indeed that one can make aesthetic judgments without aesthetic perception 
[…] is to misunderstand aesthetic judgment.  
This therefore is how I shall use "aesthetic judgment" throughout. Where there is no 
question of aesthetic perception, I shall use some other expression like "attribution of 
aesthetic quality" or "aesthetic statement." Thus, rather as a color-blind man may infer that 
something is green without seeing […] so someone may attribute balance or gaudiness to 
a painting, or say that it is too pale, without himself having judged it so. 
Before we consider how to evaluate Sibley’s claims here, we should note that his account of 
‘aesthetic judgement’ is, to some extent, a stipulative one. This means that, on his account, it 
will certainly be true (indeed true by definition) that perception is required for aesthetic 
judgement. Yet, such stipulations will not, by themselves, tell us anything about aesthetic 
judgements in the sense I outlined above. This passage does, however, highlight some 
substantive worries for the claim that aesthetic judgements (in my sense) can be formed on 
any basis other than perception. 
 Consider, for example, the comparison Sibley draws between the person attempting 
to make aesthetic judgements in the absence of perception and a colour-blind person inferring 
that an object is green. It seems plausible that – as Frank Jackson’s [1982] famous Mary 
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example is sometimes taken to illustrate – someone without any perceptual experience of 
colours would lack some important piece of knowledge regarding what it is for a particular 
object, o, to be green (since they lack any subjective experience of greenness). Further, suppose 
we made the additional claim that this missing element is so important that someone in this 
position wouldn’t even understand greenness sufficiently to fully form the judgement that o 
is green rather than, say, forming the meta-semantic judgement that ‘o is green’ expresses a 
truth. Of course, this interpretation of the colour case is highly controversial and there is 
considerable debate over the question of what (if anything) Mary learns upon leaving her 
black and white room, as well as the impact this has with respect to her ability to make full-
blooded colour judgements prior to doing so. If, however, we accept an interpretation of this 
kind then it seems to point to a reason for endorsing the claim that perception provides the 
only route to aesthetic judgement.  
We could, after all, tell an exactly parallel story according to which someone without 
any experience of an aesthetic property such as gracefulness would be unable to fully form 
the judgement that o is graceful rather than, say, forming the meta-semantic judgement that 
‘o is graceful’ expresses a truth. Indeed, there are some, such as Michael Tanner, appear to 
explicitly adopt such a view of the aesthetic. According to Tanner [2003: 33] ‘judgements of 
aesthetic […] value must be based on first-hand experience of their objects […] because one is 
not capable of understanding the meanings of the terms which designate the properties 
without the experience’. Again, this story is extremely controversial but its truth or falsity is 
largely irrelevant since the very fact that the reasons given in the aesthetic case so closely 
parallel those in the colour case undermines any support it might offer for the perceptual 
canonicity claim. This is because, as we have seen above, proponents of the perceptual 
7 
 
canonicity claim intend their view to highlight something importantly distinctive about the 
relationship between aesthetic judgments and perception. An aim which the close parallel 
between aesthetic judgements and colour judgements here clearly undermines.  
Further, this motivation for accepting the perceptual canonicity claim wouldn’t – as 
Malcolm Budd [2003: 388] has already argued elsewhere – require that every aesthetic 
judgement be based on perception of its object but merely that anyone looking to make 
aesthetic judgements would have to have had some perceptual experience of the relevant 
aesthetic properties. Those of us who have already experienced gracefulness (and mutatis 
mutandis other aesthetic properties) would, even granting the controversial claims about what 
experience teaches outlined above, still be perfectly able to form the judgement that some new 
object we have not yet perceived is graceful. Just as, after leaving her black and white room, 
Mary would be perfectly able to form the judgement that some new object is red prior to any 
perceptual experience of that particular object. 
 
It could be objected, though, that the analogy between the colour case and the aesthetic case 
here isn’t as close as I have suggested.2 Claims about what Mary knows prior to leaving her 
room are (to say the least) controversial and someone who rejected a concept empiricist view 
concerning colour concepts might claim that Mary can make fully fledged colour judgements 
without ever experiencing colour for herself. Given such a position, combined with the view 
that a parallel feat is not possible for Mary’s aesthetic analogue, we would arrive at a clear 
contrast between the two cases. This contrast arises because, in the aesthetic case, we would 
                                                          
2 I thank an anonymous referee from the journal for pushing me to consider this worry. 
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require some experience of gracefulness in general to be able to judge that some particular 
object was graceful but we would not need to have experienced redness in general to judge 
that some particular object was red. Yet, while such a combination of views is consistent, it is 
difficult to see what could motivate it. The most natural position seems to either be one which 
accepts concept empiricism concerning both aesthetic concepts and colour concepts or else 
one which rejects empiricism in both cases. A mixed verdict (such as the one outlined above) 
would, therefore, require a powerful argument in its favour. As things stand, though, no such 
argument is forthcoming. There is, after all, nothing in the interpretation of the arguments 
from Sibley and Tanner that I have been discussing (nor in the extant literature on aesthetic 
judgement more generally) which would justify accepting an empiricist view of aesthetic 
concepts while rejecting such a view concerning colour concepts.  
There is, however, another way of reading these passages. A reading which locates the 
contrast not in an appeal to a lack of perceptual experience with respect to a particular 
determinable aesthetic property such as gracefulness but, rather, in a lack of perceptual 
experience concerning the way in which this particular object instantiates some determinate 
version of that property. I will consider an interpretation of this kind in section 5 below. 
 
4. The Only Legitimate Route to Aesthetic Judgement? 
Another interpretation of the perceptual canonicity claim is a normative one according to 
which perception is the only route by which we can legitimately form aesthetic judgements. 
Views of this kind have famously been defended by various prominent aestheticians such as 
Richard Wollheim who claims that ‘judgments of aesthetic value [...] must be based on first-
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hand experience of their objects’ [1980: 233] and Marcia Muelder Eaton [1994: 392] who 
maintains that ‘direct experience is always required for verification of aesthetic’ judgements.  
 There are, however, a number of ways in which principles of this kind might be 
interpreted.  First, one might take these principles to be making epistemic claims to the effect 
that it is only possible to achieve aesthetic knowledge on the basic of perception. Second, one 
might come to think that there is some non-epistemic norm – that is a norm which doesn’t 
determine ‘whether the belief the recipient is offered would count as knowledge’ [Hopkins 
2011: 147] – which renders aesthetic judgements illegitimate when not formed in this way. 
Finally, one might claim that aesthetic judgements are best construed in an expressivist 
manner and that some feature of judgements of this kind prevents their being properly formed 
in the absence of perceptual experience. In discussing these principles below, I will, for 
convenience’s sake, focus on epistemic interpretations but my arguments will apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to other versions also. 
 Regardless of how we interpret such principles, though, this version of the perceptual 
canonicity claim encounters a fundamental problem; it is false. There are various routes, 
besides direct perception, by which someone might come to legitimately form an aesthetic 
judgement. In particular, there are compelling reasons – discussed in Meskin [2004], Laetz 
[2008], and Robson [forthcoming] – to believe that legitimate aesthetic judgements can be 
formed on the basis of testimony and – as discussed in Livingston [2003] and Robson [2014] – 
on the basis of suitable descriptions. Of course, while I take this version of the perceptual 
canonicity claim to be mistaken, I am aware that this conclusion remains controversial. I will 
not, however, rehash the various arguments that have been offered here. Rather, I will aim to 
show that this interpretation of the perceptual canonicity claim is mistaken via a rather more 
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circuitous route. A route which involves targeting a further interpretation of the perceptual 
canonicity claim which I will address in the next section. This interpretation makes a weaker 
claim than the version under consideration here and so the failure of the former will show, a 
fortiori, that the latter must also fail.  
 
5. The Most Specific Route to Aesthetic Judgement? 
A further interpretation of the perceptual canonicity claim suggests that it is only perception 
which allows us to legitimately make aesthetic judgements with respect to certain 
determinate, rather than determinable, aesthetic properties. Consider, for example, a putative 
case of someone who comes to know that an object is graceful purely on the basis of someone 
else’s testimony that ‘the object is graceful’. Even if we assume, contra the principles discussed 
in section 4, that such aesthetic knowledge is available via testimony it seems eminently 
plausible to maintain that the recipient of such testimony would, in various respects, lack 
knowledge of the ways in which the object in question is graceful. Yet, this kind of knowledge 
would typically be possessed by someone who had perceived the object for themselves. There 
is, after all, a vast array of different objects which may be assessed aesthetically and an 
indefinite number of ways in which such objects might be graceful, elegant, harrowing, 
beautiful, delicate, and so forth.  
Of course, the issue here cannot be purely quantitative since there are also indefinitely 
many ways in which an object might be green or a sound high pitched. Still, even if the ways 
in which an object can be graceful are no more numerous than the ways in which it can be 
green, they are certainly more disparate. Consider, for example, that according to most 
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metaphysical views of colour greenness supervenes on a rather limited range of underlying 
microphysical properties. By contrast, there are manifold different ways in which an aesthetic 
property might supervene on underlying non-aesthetic properties. There is, for example, a 
vast difference between the beauty of a musical work, a painting, a landscape, and a face. 
Further, even with respect to objects of the same kind, there is still a wildly disparate range of 
ways in which the same aesthetic property might be instantiated. Consider, for example, the 
various kinds of beauty which might be exhibited in musical works of different genres, styles 
and moods. We might think, then, that the only way to know that an object is beautiful (or 
graceful, or gaudy, or…) in this particular way is via perception. 
Indeed, the issue here may not merely concern the legitimacy of the relevant 
judgments. Rather, we might take this to be a more plausible way of interpreting the worries 
from Sibley and Tanner (concerning the impossibility of forming aesthetic judgements in the 
absence of perception) discussed above. They may, perhaps, be taken as claiming that we can’t 
even form this very specific kind of aesthetic judgement in the absence of perceptual 
experience since we cannot understand what it means to say that an object is beautiful in this 
particular way without such experience.  
Once again, though, this interpretation of the perceptual canonicity claim turns out to 
be less persuasive than it may initially seem. It certainly the case that we can get some idea of 
the particular ways in which an object is beautiful without perceiving the object for ourselves. 
Merely learning that the object we are discussing is a musical work rather than a painting, or 
a requiem rather than a lullaby (knowledge which can easily be acquired in the absence of 
perceptual experience) would already give us some idea as to the specific ways in which the 
object is beautiful. There is, however, no need to stop here. There is, after all, so very much 
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that we can learn about a work without perceiving it for ourselves. Consider, for example, 
Aaron Ridley’s [1996: 419] discussion of his (hypothetically) refusing to read Anita Brookner’s 
latest novel on the basis that 
I've read several of Anita Brookner's novels, under increasing protest. Her tiny stock of 
recurrent themes fails to engage my interest; I find her style translucent in all the wrong 
ways; I gather from reviews that the latest one is simply more of the same; and I feel 
oppressed by the certainty of what to expect.3 
In this instance it seems that Ridley would be able to make some very specific judgements 
about the aesthetic character of the new work without ever reading it.4 And, of course, the 
same applies in a range of other cases.  
Further, this line of argument can be applied to show not only that we are able to make 
such judgements but that we are able to do so legitimately. We can have excellent inductive 
grounds for postulating many of the specific aesthetic properties which a new Tim Burton 
film or a new Daft Punk album will have without encountering these specific works for 
ourselves (provided, of course, that we are sufficiently familiar with the relevant artists’ 
oeuvres). It may be objected, however, that these beliefs don’t really have the status of 
knowledge but are merely educated guesses.5 There is, after all, nothing to prevent Burton 
from deciding on a whim to make his next film a gritty piece of social realism. Thankfully, 
though, we need not rely on induction alone here. Rather, we can – as Ridley suggests – 
                                                          
3 There may be some concerns regarding the use of a literary example here since there are (as discussed 
in, e.g., Shelley [2003: 373-5] famous debates surrounding whether such works possess genuinely 
perceptible aesthetic properties. I will, however, ignore such concerns here since (as I highlight further 
below) the argument clearly generalises beyond the literary case. 
4 For the record, I don’t share Ridley’s assessment of Brookner’s work but the general point still stands. 
5 I thank an anonymous referee from the journal for bringing this point to my attention. 
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combine the kind of inductive considerations outlined above with suitable testimony. In short, 
we can ask others (who we know to be reliable about such matters) to confirm whether things 
are as we suspect; whether the new work is typical for its creator, whether their writing still 
has that particular quality, whether their music employs the same familiar motifs, and so 
forth. Given this, we have good reason to reject the claim that we cannot legitimately form 
very specific aesthetic judgements (and, a fortiori, that we cannot legitimately form any 
aesthetic judgements) in the absence of first-hand experience). 
 How widely can such strategies be applied though? A common line to take at this stage 
(Livingston {2003: 275-7], Ridley [1996: 421-2]) is to suggest that this only holds with respect 
to certain examples and that while this kind of determinate knowledge may be possible with 
respect to works of popular art, or of what Ridley terms ‘medium-grade art’, this will not be 
so with respect to truly great or revolutionary artworks. That is that, as Livingston [2003: 276] 
puts things, ‘even the most genial descriptions cannot enlighten us regarding the specific 
splendours of works by Schubert, Villon, Balthus, et al., if we have no prior acquaintance with 
these works’. 
Yet, even this weaker claim still encounters difficulties. First, when phrased in this way 
it begins, as Livingston [ibid.] highlights, to look less like an important claim about the nature 
of aesthetic judgement and more like a very modest empirical claim concerning a very 
circumscribed set of aesthetic judgments. Second, such a modest claim no longer allows us to 
maintain a clear distinction between aesthetic judgements and judgements of other kinds. It 
would, for example, often be extremely difficult to convey the idea that an object is a certain 
determinate shade of green without any perceptual experience of that object’s particular 
greenness. This is, at least in part, because we very rarely have specific names for particular 
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determinate colours (International Klein Blue being one notable exception). Finally, it is not 
clear that this weaker claim is even true.  
Various philosophers and art theorists have recently argued, persuasively in my view, 
that we overestimate the extent to which great innovations (in art and elsewhere) involve 
radical departures from what came before and that although ‘it is common to portray progress 
in the artifactual realm – whether art or technology – as propagated by genius inventors or 
artists making great leaps forward […] this is not in fact how artifacts develop’ [Eaton 
forthcoming: 22].6 If this is so, then it looks as if we may well be able to arrive at fairly specific 
judgements concerning the particular greatness of some new artist’s work by combining our 
knowledge of what came before with some well-chosen information from suitable critics. 
Even if we accept the traditional view of artistic genius as involving radical departures from 
previous work, though, we should still be able to learn a lot about an unfamiliar work by, say, 
Schubert on the basis of his previous work (in a manner somewhat similar to that described 
by Ridley with regards to Brookner above). That is not, of course, to suggest that the new work 
will be entirely predictable or generic, far from it, but even great artists have been known to 
frequently revisit favourite motifs and themes. Indeed, we often take it to be a prerequisite for 
someone’s being a first-rate artist that they have their own artistic ‘voice’ or ‘style’.  
 
6. The Actual Route to Aesthetic Judgement? 
A final way of interpreting the perceptual canonicity claim is as a descriptive claim according 
to which people do not form aesthetic judgements on the basis of sources other than 
                                                          
6 For arguments in support of this claim see Eaton [ibid.] and the references therein. 
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perception. Views of this kind date back at least as far as Kant’s claim that ‘if a man […] does 
not find a building, a prospect, or a poem beautiful, a hundred voices all highly praising it 
will not force his innermost agreement’ [1790 / 2005: 94] and that ‘[w]hether a dress, a house, 
a flower is beautiful is a matter upon which one declines to allow one’s judgement to be 
swayed by any reasons or principles’ [ibid.: 37]. Perhaps what makes perception special, then, 
is just that it is (or is close to being) the only route by which we do, as a matter of fact, form 
aesthetic judgements. 
 At first glance, this view may seem highly plausible. After all, it doubtless seems to 
many people as if they only form their aesthetic judgements on the basis of first-hand 
perception. The intuitive appeal of this view is, however, by the by. Time and again, empirical 
research has clearly demonstrated that we are surprisingly bad at identifying the sources of 
our own judgements and, in particular, that we tend to overestimate the extent to which our 
judgements in various domains are formed on the basis of first-hand perceptual experience. 
Consider, for example, the so called ‘misinformation effect’ – identified in a series of classic 
studies by Elizabeth Loftus [1975] – on the basis of which subsequent misleading testimony 
can permanently alter a subject’s own recollection of events. For example, an eye witness to a 
car crash between two blue cars may, after reading an account according to which one of the 
cars was red, come to believe not only that the car was red but that this belief originated in 
their own perceptual experience of the incident. This general picture should certainly give us 
reason to doubt our intuitions with respect to the descriptive claim. There is, however, reason 
to go beyond mere scepticism in this respect since there is a broad range of empirical evidence 
demonstrating that we frequently do form aesthetic judgements by means other than 
perception.  
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Let’s look at one illustrative example in detail. Ginsburgh and Ours [2003] examined 
results in Belgium’s prestigious Queen Elizabeth music competition and found that musicians 
‘who are successful in the Queen Elizabeth competition seem to be rewarded by subsequent 
success’ [ibid.: 294]. It was show, for example, that those who were ranked higher in the 
contest were typically regarded as better performers (and as producing better performances) 
by professional music critics. One possible explanation for this result, which Ginsburgh and 
Ours ultimately defend, is that the contest rankings themselves are playing a significant role 
in determining the later aesthetic beliefs of these critics. This explanation would, however, 
clearly be at odds with the version of the perceptual canonicity claim currently under 
consideration. Yet, this is hardly the only available explanation for this correlation and it could 
be that, as Ginsburgh and Ours themselves note, it simply arises because ‘those who are better 
ranked in the competition are better musicians anyway’ [ibid.]. In response to this worry, 
Ginsburgh and Ours adopted a rather ingenious method for testing this alternative 
explanation. They began by noting the surprisingly large extent to which results in the contest 
itself were influenced by the, randomly determined, order in which performers appeared 
(with those who performed first and last tending to be more favourably received than those 
in middle positions). After determining the extent to which the rankings of performers were 
affected by their order of performance, Ginsburgh and Ours then proceeded to produce an 
adjusted ranking of all the performers based on ordering effects alone. Having done so, they 
then compared this adjusted ranking to the reputation which each performer now enjoyed 
amongst Belgian music critics. Their results demonstrated a clear correlation between these 
adjusted rankings and subsequent reputation among critics, to the extent that Ginsburgh and 
Ours were willing to declare that ‘the opinion of music critics is more influenced by the 
ranking than by the quality of the performers’ [ibid.].  
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Of course, the beliefs which the critics have formed in this case are clearly somewhat 
problematic from a normative point of view but this is of no help to defenders of the 
perceptual canonicity claim for two reasons. First, the version of their claim currently under 
consideration is a purely descriptive one, rendering the normative status of the beliefs in 
question moot. Second, the feature which renders such beliefs problematic (being strongly 
influenced by aesthetically irrelevant ordering effects) is also present in the first-hand 
perceptual judgements of the contest judges themselves. Given these results, then, (alongside 
similar studies from, for example, Dixon et al. [2015] and Salganik & Watts [2008]) a 
descriptive claim according to which perception has anything approaching a monopoly as the 
route to aesthetic judgement becomes clearly implausible.  
 
It might be objected, though, that everything I have said above is compatible with a weaker 
version of the descriptive claim according to which perception is merely the typical or 
standard (rather than the exclusive) route to aesthetic judgement.7 We would, however, need 
to say much more about how this claim should be spelled out.  
 If the claim is that we rarely form non-perceptual aesthetic judgements then this seems 
to be mistaken, since I know of no good reason to treat the case I outlined above as an isolated 
exception. Indeed, Ginsburgh and Ours focus on the judgements of experts who we would 
typically expect to be even more reliant on their own first-hand judgements than laypeople. 
Further, there is (as the references above indicate, and as I discuss in more detail in Robson 
[2015]) a wide range of empirical work highlighting similar cases. By contrast, an even weaker 
                                                          
7 I thank an anonymous referee from the journal for drawing my attention to this worry. 
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interpretation of the ‘standard route’ claim according to which we form the majority of our 
aesthetic judgements on the basis of perception strikes me as far more. Still, this should 
provide little comfort for defenders of the perceptual canonicity claim. First, for reasons 
already highlighted above, I am unwilling to put much weight on what we take to be 
intuitively plausible about our belief forming methods in aesthetics. Second, and more 
substantively, any intuitive plausibility which such a claim has seems to be matched by 
various non-aesthetic cases. I would, for example, be very surprised if we didn’t form the 
majority of our judgements concerning shape and colour on the basis of perception. Once 
again, then, we are left with no distinctive relationship between the aesthetic and the 
perceptual. 
  
7. Conclusions 
We have seen, then, that there are good reasons to reject all of the interpretations of the 
perceptual canonicity claim I have considered. Yet, it could reasonably be objected that this 
doesn’t entail that no possible interpretation of the claim is successful. There may, after all, be 
other, more plausible, ways of interpreting the perceptual canonicity claim which I have not 
considered here. I have tried, so far as is possible, to address all extant interpretations of the 
claim but it will always remain open to the proponent of perceptual canonicity to suggest 
novel interpretations which might prove more successful. Until they are able to do so, though, 
the prospects for the perceptual canonicity claim appear rather bleak. 
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It might be claimed, though, that we could have good reason to accept that some version of the 
perceptual canonicity claim must be true – because, for example, we have an excellent 
argument in favour of accepting the general thrust of the perceptual canonicity intuition – 
even if we weren’t yet sure which version to opt for. In principle, this is certainly correct but, 
unsurprisingly, I am less than sanguine about the prospects for such an approach. Again, I 
cannot hope to respond to every possible line of argument which could be offered here but 
addressing one possible line of defence for something like the perceptual canonicity intuition 
should prove illustrative.8  
Consider a case where you and I are arguing about whether a work (w) has some 
property (p). You have seen the work for yourself and, on that basis, believe that it possesses 
p. I have not seen w for myself but believe, on the basis of testimony from a reliable critic, that 
w lacks p. It seems that, no matter how much of an expert or how scrupulously honest the 
relevant critic is, I will be at a clear dialectical disadvantage in such a case. Indeed, it seems 
that I will not be able to sensibly engage in any kind of reasoned argument with you until I 
have seen the work for myself. We might think, then, that such cases clearly demonstrate that 
the person who forms their aesthetic judgements on the basis of first-hand perception enjoys 
some advantage over the one who forms them by other means (even if we are unable to specify 
the exact nature of that advantage). 
Such a conclusion would, however, be premature. In my view, the main disadvantage 
I possess in the case above concerns my lack of access to certain relevant facts. In particular, I 
do not know the reasons why the critic takes the work to lack the relevant property (indeed, 
it may well be that these reasons can’t be conveyed by testimony alone). Give this, it is highly 
                                                          
8 I thank an anonymous referee from the journal for pushing me to consider this worry. 
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unlikely that I would be able to contribute much of value to our dispute (beyond merely 
parroting the critic’s conclusion). This situation gives us no reason to endorse the perceptual 
canonicity claim, though, since there are non-perceptual cases where such an impasse does 
not arise. One example of this can be found by revisiting the kinds of case I discussed in section 
5 above. While I may not have seen the latest Tim Burton film for myself, I may still be able to 
usefully contribute to a debate concerning its merits if I knew it was just ‘more of the same’. 
Given the availability of such cases, then, the argument under consideration fails to lend 
support to any version of the perceptual canonicity claim. 
 
It is worth stressing, though, that my intention here has not been to deny that there are any 
interesting connections between aesthetics and perception. Rather, my conclusions are 
entirely neutral with respect to a number of influential claims in this area. They are, for 
example, compatible with Kendall Walton’s [1970: 337] claim that ‘there is something right in 
the idea that what matters aesthetically about a painting or a sonata is just how it looks or 
sounds’ and Bence Nanay’s [2014: 101] recent position according to which ‘many, maybe even 
most, traditional problems in aesthetics are in fact about philosophy of perception and can, as 
a result, be fruitfully addressed with the help of the conceptual apparatus of philosophy of 
perception’. I am not, therefore, denying that there is any fundamental link (or links) between 
the aesthetic and the perceptual but merely suggesting that those in search of such a link will 
not find it by appealing to any version of the perceptual canonicity claim.9 
                                                          
9 Many thanks to Danielle Adams, Sarah Adams, Stephen Hetherington, Paisley Livingston, Aaron 
Meskin, Emily Paul, audiences at Antwerp and Southampton, and three anonymous referees from the 
journal for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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